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ANNEX I.
Memorandum by Mr. Newton respecting Bolshevik Activities in China.
AS the question has been raised for consideration of making Bolshevik activities in China the occasion for a general campaign against the Bolsheviks, action which I would regard with considerable misgiving, I would like to submit the following observations:-
If we look back over five years we find a vast change in the influence of Bolshevism throughout Europe. For a period after the war the spectre of Bolshevism loomed large and threatened to cause greater ruin than the war itself. But once contact was established with the actualities of Bolshevism, its influence, which was based on discontent and vague suggestion, and on no constructive realities, began to wane, and Bolshevism was found to be its own best antidote. In Hungary and in Italy there was an overdose of inoculation, and the reaction has been correspondingly
severe.
But our fears of the Russian Bolsheviks, our overtures to them, and, in particular, certain declarations that the world could not recover without their aid, probably resulted in postponing the day of their collapse or reformation. Events have proved that, desirable as the return of Russia to the comity of nations may be, it is not essential, except to the Bolsheviks themselves.
To launch a general attack against the Bolsheviks now would, it seems to me, be an equally serious mistake. For it would exaggerate the importance of their enmity just as the former course exaggerated the importance of their friendship, and would equally help to prolong their influence.
Left to themselves the Bolsheviks in Russia cannot impute the blame for their failures to others. They must justify themselves by their own works and follow up destruction by construction if they are to survive. This they can only achieve by abandoning the practice, if not the theory, of Bolshevism itself. Meanwhile, they have already discredited themselves in Europe, and it seems quite likely that within the next few years, perhaps one or two, or even less, it will be generally realised that they are not merely discredited, but in themselves futile. From that it will be a short step to recognise that the crazy mischief-makers of Moscow are not merely futile, but are positively ridiculous. Their end as a world force will then come of itself without any external attack.
Turning to Asia we find in Turkey and Persia instructive examples of the growth and subsequent decline of Bolshevik influence. The former in particular offers an interesting analogy. Until the Treaty of Lausanne the Entente Powers remained the enemies of Turkey, who had, therefore, the more reason for welcoming the aid proffered by the Bolsheviks. But Bolshevik doctrine, once properly under- stood, was revealed as being repugnant to the whole tradition and outlook of the country. The Soviet agents were soon treated as they deserved, and their creed definitely discredited. Bolshevism is even more repugnant to the thought and feeling of China, so much so that the Soviet agents dare not themselves reveal the full doctrine of Communism. But it is bound to come out, and the more its true inward- ness and Dead Sea fruit can be made known the better.
In China the underlying causes of the present troubles are firstly, the inherent dislike of the foreigner, which has always existed; secondly, the growth of student movements and of Nationalism; and thirdly, Bolshevik influence. Of these, the third cause is, I believe, the least important fundamentally, while the distrust and dislike which contact with Bolshevism engenders are as likely as not to disgust the better elements among the Nationalists. Nationalism may well develop into a formidable force, and eventually compel a revision of foreign relations with China, as has happened in Turkey; but in Bolshevism it will find no useful ally, and if we launch a general attack on Bolshevism we shall, in my judgment, be misjudging the real forces at work in China, and actually revitalising the Bolshevik world-influence which we seek to eliminate. Mere force is more likely to aggravate than heal such a scourge, for which the true remedy, in my opinion, is to expose the treachery. criminal insanity and the sterility of Bolshevism, whenever and wherever we can.
It is worth noting that the most friendly leader to the foreigner in China is the man who has come into direct contact with Soviet Russia, Chang Tso-lin, the Governor of Manchuria. There are reasons of internal policy for Chang's endeavour to stand well with the foreigner, but his dislike of the Soviet is entirely sincere and founded on his direct experience of their aims and methods.
Foreign Office, June 25, 1925.
I. Memorandum respecting Bolshevik Activities in Chios
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II. Whampoa Military School. Report by British Military Attaché
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II. Mr. A. L. Scott's Memorandum on Political Situation in Canton in
June 1925
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IV. Correspondence with Canton Government just before June 23
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V.- Events of June 23 described by Captain Scott, R.N.
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VI-Events of June 23 described by Sir J, Jamieson
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VII-Events of June 23 described by Fu Ping-ch'ung (including the five
demauds)..
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VIII. Details of Chinese killed and wounded in the incident of June 23 IX. The Strike at Hong Kong. Memorandum by Sir R. E. Stubbs
X.- Pronunciamento of Canton City Government
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XI. Sir J. Jamieson's Report on the Boycott (September 11, 1925) XII-The Navigation Rules" (second edition, of October 22, 1925) XIII. Swatow
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XIV.-Chou En Lai's speech to the Swatow Unions
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XV.-Article on Patriotic Movement at Canton by Y. L. Leo
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XVI. Two despatches from Sir C. Clementi, Governor of Hong Kong, describing the eveute leading up to and connected with the visit of the Colonial Secretary, Hong Kong to Canton, in December 1925..
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XVII. Paraphrase of Houg Kong telegram of January 26
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XVIII. Interchange of telegrams about Canton
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(A.) Foreign Office No. 30 to Peking of January 26 (B.) Foreign Office No. 35 to Peking of January 29
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(C.) Peking telegram No. 39 of January 30
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(D.) Peking telegram No. 40 of January 80
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(E) Peking telegram No. 42 of February 1
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(F.) Canton telegram No. 5 of February 2
XIX. Telegram from Hong Kong to Colonial Office, February 6, 1926
XX. Extract from "Morning Post" of January 14, 1926
XXI, Washington Nine-Power China Treaty of February 6, 1922 .. XXII. Extracts from Treaties of Nanking and Tien-tsin
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